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In this paper I review the theories of induced technical and institutional 
change. I discuss the sources of the demand and supply of institutional 
innovation. The sources of institutional innovation are illustrated by changes 
in land tenure relations in Philippine agriculture, by the development of 
institutional design principles based on studies of small scale resource 
management systems and by the transition from command and control to 
market based systems of resource management in the United States. I 
introduce the concept of incentive compatible mechanism and institutional 
design. In a final section I elaborate a pattern model that maps the 
relationships among changes in resource endowments, cultural endowments, 
technology and institutions.  
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A central premise of this paper is that the demand for social science 
knowledge is derived from the demand for institutional change.
2 If this view 
is correct then any claim by the social science disciplines and related 
professions for public support depends on a credible promise that advances 
in social science knowledge represent an efficient source of institutional 
innovation. 
 I first review briefly the theories of induced technical and institutional 
change. I then turn to a discussion of the sources of demand and the sources 
of supply of institutional change I also discuss the concepts of incentive 
compatible mechanism and institutional design. I end the paper with a 
discussion of some of the elements of a “pattern” or “appreciative” model of 
the relationships among changes in resource and cultural endowments and 
technical and institutional change. 
 
1.   Induced Technical Change  
 Modern interest in the effects of changes (and differences) in relative 
factor endowments and prices on the rate and direction of technical change 
was initially stimulated by an observation by Sir John Hicks:  “The  real 
                                                 
2 This paper is a revised and extended version of V. W. Ruttan, 2006, “Social 
Science Knowledge and Induced Institutional Innovation: An Institutional 
Design Perspective,” Journal of Institutional Economics 2(3): 249-272.  I 
also draw on Ruttan and Hayami (1984) and Ruttan (2001, 2003).  
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reason for the predominance  of labor saving innovation is surely that …  a 
change in relative prices of factors of production is itself a spur to innovation 
and to innovation of a particular kind-directed at economizing the use of a 
factor which has become relatively expensive” (Hicks 1932: 124-125). 
Hicks’ suggestion laid fallow until it was challenged by Salter in 1960:  “At 
competitive equilibrium each factor is being paid its marginal value product; 
therefore all factors are equally expensive to all firms (Salter 1960: 16). 
Salter went on to argue “the entrepreneur is interested in reducing costs in 
total and not particular costs” (Salter 1960: 43-44). In retrospect is  difficult 
to  understand why Salter’s criticism generated so much attention except that 
students of economic growth were increasingly puzzled about why, in the 
presence of substantial capital deepening in the U.S. economy, factor shares 
to labor and capital had remained relatively stable The differential growth 
rates were too large to be explained by simple factor substitution. 
The debate about induced technical change centered on two 
alternative models-- a growth theoretic model and a microeconomic version. 
The most formally developed version was a growth theoretic model 
introduced by Kennedy (1964, 1966) and elaborated by Samuelson (1965). 
Kennedy cast his model in terms of changing relative factor shares because 
of the growth theory implications. By the early 1970s the growth-theoretic  
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approach to induced technical change was itself subject to severe criticism. 
Nordhaus insisted that the model as “too defective to be used in serious 
economic analysis” (Nordhaus 1973, 2008).   
The second approach to induced innovation, built directly on Hicksian 
microeconomic foundations, was developed by Syed Ahmad (1966, 1967a, 
1967b). In work published in the early and mid-1970s Yujiro Hayami, Hans 
Binswanger, Colin Thirtle, and I extended the micro economic version of 
induced technical change and tested it against the history of agricultural 
development in the United States and Japan and in cross country perspective 
(Hayami and Ruttan 1970, 1971; Binswanger 1974; Binswanger and Ruttan 
1978; Thirtle and Ruttan 1987). Rather than attempting a detailed review of 
the econometric results I draw your attention to Figure 1. 
/ insert Figure 1 about here / 
By the late 1980s, in reaction to the Nordhaus criticisms and the 
emergence of new macro economic endogenous growth theories (Romer 
1986; Lucas 1988), interest in induced technical change was beginning to 
wane.  Interest was sustained, however, by agricultural and resource 
economists who continued to find the micro economic version of induced 
technical change useful (Runge 1999). Recent work on the theoretical 
foundation of induced technical change theory and its implications by  
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Acemoglu suggest a possible revival of interest by development economists 
(Acemoglu 2002, 2007). 
The demonstration that technical change can be treated as largely 
endogenous to the development process does not imply that the progress of 
either agricultural or industrial technology can be left to an ‘invisible hand' 
that drives technology along an 'efficient' path determined by relative 
resource endowments. The capacity to advance knowledge in science and 
technology is itself a result of institutional innovation – “the great invention 
of the nineteenth century was the invention of the method of invention” 
(Whitehead 1925: 96). 
 
2.  Induced Institutional Innovation 
Institutions are the rules of a society or of organizations that facilitate 
coordination among people by helping them form expectations, which each 
person can reasonably hold in dealing with others (Hayami and Ruttan 1985: 
94).
3  In the area of economic relations institutions have a crucial role in 
                                                 
3  For a review of the role of institutions, and of institutional change, in 
economic development see Lin and Nugent (1995). There is considerable 
disagreement regarding the use of the term institution. A distinction is often 
made between the concepts of institution as an organization and institutional 
arrangements. In my own work I have found it useful to employ a definition 
that includes both concepts. This is consistent with the view expressed by 
both Commons (1950: 24) and Knight (1952: 51). This inclusive definition  
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establishing expectations about the rights to use resources in economic 
activities and about the partitioning of the income streams resulting from 
economic activity: “institutions provide assurance respecting the actions of 
others, and give order and stability to expectations in the complex and 
uncertain world of economic relations.” (Runge 1981b: xv). 
Anticipation of the latent gains to be realized by overcoming the 
disequilibria resulting from changes in factor endowments, cultural 
endowments, and technology represent powerful sources of demand 
(inducements) to institutional innovation (North and Thomas 1970; Schultz 
1975). The growing disequilibria in resource allocation due to institutional 
constraints generated by economic growth create incentives for political 
entrepreneurs or leaders to organize collective action to bring about 
institutional change (Olson 1982: 74). This perspective on the sources of 
                                                                                                                                            
was also employed by Davis and North (1971: 8-9) .In his more recent work 
North excludes organization and conflates the concepts of institution and 
culture. The distinction that I make between institutions and cultural 
endowments is that institutions are the formal rules and arrangements that 
govern behavior among and within organizations while cultural endowments 
are the informal codes of behavior that have evolved to influence individual 
and group behavior. Drawing on game theoretic concepts Hurwicz 
distinguishes between institutions and mechanisms. Institutions are defined 
as families of “game forms” or mechanisms. As an example, share tenure is 
defined as an institution. It includes the entire set of mechanisms (ie., game 
forms) in which the rental share ranges between 0 and 1. Institutions can be 
represented as a correspondence between game forms (mechanisms) and 
economic environments (Hurwicz 1996).  
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demand for institutional change is similar, in some respects, to the traditional 
Marxian view.
4   
There are supply side as well as a demand side sources of institutional 
change. Advances in knowledge in the social sciences (and in related 
professions such as law, administration, planning, and social service) can 
reduce the cost of institutional change in a manner somewhat similar as 
advances in the natural sciences reduce the cost of technical change.  
Advances in game theory have, during the last several decades, enabled 
economists and political scientists to bring an increasingly powerful set of 
tools to bear on the understanding of the processes of institutional change 
(Hurwicz 1960, 1973; Schotter 1981; Ostrom 1990; Aoki 12001). In spite of 
the power of these new tools I continue to find the application of standard 
neoclassical micro-economic theory to interpret the sources of the demand 
and supply of institutional change exceedingly useful. 
                                                 
4 “At a certain stage of their development, the material forces of production 
in society come in conflict with existing relations of production, or - what is 
but a legal expression for the same thing - with the property relations within 
which they had been at work before. From forms of development of the 
forces of production these relations turn into their fetters. Then comes the 
period of social revolution. With the change of the economic foundation the 
entire immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed” (Marx 
1913: 11-12).  For a discussion of the role of technology in Marxian thought 
see Rosenberg (1982: 34-54).  
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Insistence that important advances in the understanding of the 
processes of institutional innovation and diffusion can be achieved by 
treating institutional change as endogenous to the economic system 
represents a clear departure from the tradition of modern analytical 
economics.
5 The scope of modern analytical economics is expanded by 
treating institutional change as endogenous. 
There is general agreement that institutional change has and continues 
to evolve in response to long-term changes in resource endowments such as 
the pressure of population against land resources or a rise in the price of 
labor relative to capital. But there has been substantial disagreement within 
the social sciences about the role of purposeful or rational design in 
institutional innovation.
6 Those holding an “organic” or “spontaneous order” 
perspective argue that the fact that the institutions of civilization have been 
created by human action “does not mean that man must also be able to alter 
                                                 
5 The orthodox view was expressed by Samuelson (1948: 221-22): “The 
auxiliary [institutional] constraints imposed upon the variables are not 
themselves the proper subject of welfare economics but must be taken as 
given.” Contrast this with the statement by Schotter (1981: 61): 'We view 
welfare economics as a study ... that ranks the system of rules which dictate 
social behavior.' 
6 Schotter (1981: 3-4) notes that in economics there have been, historically, 
two distinct interpretations of the sources of institutional change--“organic” 
and “collectivist.” He identifies the organic view with the work of Hayek 
and the collectivist view with the work of Commons. Hayek (1978: 3-22) 
uses the term “constructivism” rather than collectivist.   
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them at will” (Hayek 1978: 3).
7 This organic view of the sources of 
institutional change is reinforced by a theory of the “unintended 
consequences” of institutional innovation that runs through the work of 
Adam Smith, Carl Menger, Max Weber, and Frederich Hayek (Lal 1998).  
In contrast the constructivist or design perspective holds that advances in 
social science knowledge can play an important role in the rational design of 
institutional reform and institutional innovation.  
Much of my work with Yujiro Hayami on induced institutional 
innovation reflects an organic perspective. In other work, on the 
development of agricultural research institutions for example, I have 
employed both organic and constructivist perspectives (Ruttan 1982, 2001). 
I reject any demand to choose between the organic and constructivist 
perspectives. They should be viewed as complements rather than as 
alternatives. I also reject the ideological implication, advanced by some 
proponents of the organic approach that the unintended consequences of 
                                                 
7 Hayek was apparently referring to a statement by Karl Marx: “Men make 
their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it 
under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
formed, given and transmitted from the past” (Marx 1936: 15). Hayek 
regarded the explanation of the unintended patterns and regularities which 
he termed constructivism because of the inability of social theory to 
anticipate unintended consequences (Hayek 1967: 96-105).  
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institutional change preclude the possibility of a rational or analytical 
approach to institutional reform and design. 
 
3.  Demand for Institutional Innovation 
In some cases the demand for institutional innovation can be satisfied 
by the development of new forms of property rights, more efficient market 
institutions, or even by evolutionary changes arising out of direct contracting 
by individuals at the level of the community or the firm. In other cases, 
where externalities are involved, substantial political resources may have to 
be brought to bear to organize non-market institutions in order to provide for 
the supply of public goods. In this section I draw from agricultural history to 
illustrate how changes in factor endowments, technical change, and growth 
in product demand have induced organic change in property rights and 
contractual arrangements. 
The agricultural revolution that occurred in England between the 
fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries involved a substantial increase in the 
productivity of land and labor.  It was accompanied by the enclosure of open 
fields and the replacement of small peasant cultivators, who held their land 
from manorial lords, by a system in which large farmers used hired labor to 
farm the land they leased from the landlords. The First Enclosure  
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Movement, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, resulted in the 
conversion of open arable fields and commons to private pasture in areas 
suitable for grazing. It was induced by expansion in the export demand for 
wool. The Second Enclosure Movement in the eighteenth century involved 
conversion of communally managed arable land into privately operated 
units. It is now generally agreed that demand for changes in land tenure 
arrangements was largely induced by the growing disequilibrium between 
the fixed institutional rent that landlords received under copyhold tenures 
(with lifetime contracts) and the higher economic rents expected from 
adoption of new technology which became more profitable as a consequence 
of higher grain prices and lower wages. When the land was enclosed there 
was a redistribution of income from tenants to landowners and the 
disequilibrium was reduced or eliminated.
8 
In nineteenth-century Thailand, the opening of the nation to inter-
national trade and the reduction in shipping rates to Europe following the 
completion of the Suez Canal resulted in a sharp increase in the demand for 
rice. The land available for rice production, which had been abundant, 
                                                 
8 There has been a continuing debate among students of English agricultural 
history about whether the higher rents that landowners received after 
enclosure was (a) because enclosed farming was more efficient than open 
field farming, or (b) because enclosures redistributed income from farmers 
to landowners (Dahlman 1980; Allen 1982).  
  11 
became more scarce. Investment in land development for wet rice 
production for export became profitable. The rise in the profitability of rice 
production for export induced a demand for the reform of property rights in 
both land and man. Traditional rights in human property (corvee and 
slavery) were replaced by more precise private property rights in land 
(fee-simple titles) (Feeny 1982; 2002). 
3.1  Land Tenure in a Philippine Village 
 Research conducted in the Philippines during the late 1970s by 
Hayami and Kikuchi has enabled us to examine a contemporary example of 
the interrelated effects of changes in resource endowments and technical 
change on the demand for institutional change in land tenure and labor 
relations (Kikuchi and Hayami 1980; Hayami and Kikuchi 1981; Hayami 
and Kikuchi 2000). The case is particularly interesting because the 
institutional innovations occurred as a result of private contracting among 
individuals—what Hayek termed “spontaneous order” and in more recent 
literature has been referred to as “Coasian bargains” (Hayek 1978; Olson 
2000). The study is based on a rigorous analysis of microeconomic data 
from a single village over a period of about 20 years. 
Between 1956 and 1976, rice production per hectare in “Laguna 
Village” rose dramatically, from 2.5 to 6.7 metric tons per hectare per year.  
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This was due to two changes in both resource endowments and technology.  
In 1958, the national irrigation system was extended to the village. This 
permitted double-cropping to replace single-cropping. The   major technical 
change was the introduction of modern high-yielding rice varieties. The 
diffusion of modern varieties was accompanied by increased use of fertilizer 
and pesticides and by the adoption of improved cultural practices such as 
straight-row planting and intensive weeding. 
Population growth in the village was rapid. Between 1966 and 1976 
the number of households rose from 66 to 109 and the population rose from 
383 to 464, while cultivated area remained virtually constant. The number of 
landless laborer households increased from 20 to 54. In 1976, half of the 
households in the village had no land to cultivate. The average farm size 
declined from 2.3 hectares to 2.0 hectares. 
The land was farmed primarily by tenants. In 1976, only 1.7 hectares 
of the 108 hectares of cropland in the village were owned by village 
residents. Traditionally, share tenancy was the most common form of tenure. 
In both 1956 and 1966, 70 percent of the land was farmed under share tenure 
arrangements. In 1963, a new national agricultural land reform code was 
passed which was designed to break the political power of the traditional 
landed elite and to provide greater incentives to peasant producers of basic  
  13 
food crops. A major feature of the new legislation was an arrangement that 
permitted tenants to initiate a shift from share tenure to leasehold, with rent 
under the leasehold set at 25 percent of the average yield for the previous 
three years. Implementation of the code between the mid-1960s and the 
mid-1970s resulted in a decline in the percentage of land farmed under share 
tenure to 30 percent. 
The shift from share tenure to lease tenure was not, however, the only 
change in tenure relationships that occurred between 1966 and 1976. There 
was a sharp increase in the number of plots farmed under sub-tenancy 
arrangements. The number increased from one in 1956 to five in 1966 and 
16 in 1976. Sub-tenancy is illegal under the land reform code. The sub-
tenancy arrangements were usually made without the consent of the 
landowner. All cases of sub-tenancy were on land farmed under a leasehold 
arrangement. The most common sub-tenancy arrangement was 50-50 
sharing of costs and output. 
    / insert Table 1 about here / 
It was hypothesized that an incentive for the emergence of the sub-
tenancy institution was that the rent paid to landlords under the leasehold 
arrangement was below the equilibrium rent - the level which would reflect 
both the higher yields of rice obtained with the new technology and the  
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lower wage rates implied by the increase in population pressure against the 
land. 
To test this hypothesis, market prices were used to compute the value 
of the unpaid factor inputs (family labor and capital) for different tenure 
arrangements during the 1976 wet season. The results indicate that the 
share-to-land was lowest and the operators' surplus was highest for the land 
under leasehold tenancy. In contrast, the share-to-land was highest and no 
surplus was left for the operator who cultivated the land under the sub-
tenancy arrangement (Table 1). Indeed, the share-to-land when the land was 
farmed under sub- tenancy was very close to the sum of the share-to-land 
plus the operators' surplus under the other tenure arrangement. 
The results are consistent with the hypothesis. A substantial portion of 
the economic rent was captured by the leasehold tenants in the form of 
operators' surplus. On the land farmed under a sub-tenancy arrangement, the 
rent was shared between the leaseholder and the landlord. 
The sub-tenancy contract was an institutional innovation arrived at by 
voluntary agreements among farm operators, tenants and laborers. The land 
reform laws gave leasehold tenants strong protection of their tenancy rights. 
It gave them the right to continue tilling the soil at an institutional rent that 
was lower then the economic rent. But the laws prohibited tenants from  
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renting their land to someone else who might utilize it more efficiently, 
when they became elderly or found more profitable off-farm employment, 
for example. Sub-tenancy reduced such inefficiency due to the institutional 
rigidity in the land rental market resulting from the land reform programs.     
The induced institutional innovation process leading toward the 
establishment of equilibrium in land rental markets occurred very rapidly in 
spite of the fact that the transactions between landlords and tenants were less 
than fully monetized. Informal contractual arrangements or agreements were 
utilized. The subleasing contract evolved without the mobilization of 
substantial political activity or bureaucratic effort. Indeed, the subleasing 
arrangement evolved in spite of legal prohibition. Where substantial political 
and bureaucratic resources must be mobilized to bring about technical or 
institutional change, the changes occur much more slowly, as in the cases of 
the English enclosure movements and the Thai property rights cases referred 
to at the beginning of this section. 
 
 4.  The Supply of Institutional Innovation 
The disequilibria in economic relationships associated with economic 
growth, such as technical change leading to the generation of new income 
streams and changes in relative factor endowments have been identified as  
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important sources of demand for institutional change. But the sources of 
supply of institutional innovation are less well understood (Olson 1968; 
Ostrom 1990). The factors that reduce the cost of institutional innovation 
have received only limited attention by economists or by other social 
scientists. 
In the Philippines village case discussed earlier, land tenure 
innovation in Laguna Village was supplied, in response to the changes in 
demand generated by changing factor endowments and new income streams, 
through the individual and joint decisions of owner-cultivators, tenants and 
laborers. But even at this level it was necessary for gains to the innovators to 
be large enough to offset the risk of ignoring the land reform prohibitions 
against subleasing.
9 
 The supply of major institutional innovations typically involves the 
mobilization of substantial resources by political entrepreneurs and 
innovators. It is useful to think in terms of a supply schedule of institutional 
innovation that is determined by the marginal cost schedule facing political 
entrepreneurs as they attempt to design new institutions and resolve the 
                                                 
9 Demsetz (1964) has pointed out that the relative costs of using market and 
political institutions is rarely given explicit consideration in the literature on 
market failure. An appropriate way of interpreting the 'public goods' vs. 
'private goods' issue is to ask whether the costs of providing a market are too 
high relative to the cost of non-market alternatives.  A similar point is made 
by Hurwicz (1972).    
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conflicts among interest groups (or suppression of opposition when 
necessary). 
To the extent that the private return to political entrepreneurs is 
different from the social return, the institutional innovation will not be 
supplied at all or at a socially optimum level. If the institutional innovation 
is expected to result in a loss to a dominant political bloc, the innovation 
may not be forthcoming even if it is expected to produce a large net gain to 
society as a whole. And socially undesirable institutional innovations may 
occur not only from the unintended consequences of institutional innovation 
but as a result of innovations that are designed to generate economic or 
political benefits to the entrepreneur or the interest group that may impose 
costs that exceed the gains to society (Tullock 1967; Krueger 1974; Tollison 
1982).
10 
The failure of many developing countries to institutionalize the 
agricultural research capacity needed to take advantage of the large gains 
from relatively modest investments in technical change may be due, in part, 
                                                 
10 A referee for an earlier draft of this paper raised the question of whether it 
might be possible that errors in social science research might result in 
institutional innovations that make society worse off. The reviewer also 
raised the question of what mechanisms exist to discipline political 
entrepreneurs comparable to the market mechanism in economics. These 
important questions are dealt with in a vast literature in the field of public 
choice and political economy (Acemoglu 2005; Dalrymple 2006). I return to 
this issue later in this paper.  
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to the divergence between social returns and the private returns to political 
entrepreneurs. In the mid-1920s, for example, agricultural development in 
Argentina appeared to be proceeding along a path roughly comparable to 
that of the United States. Mechanization of crop production lagged slightly 
behind that in the United States. Grain yields per hectare averaged slightly 
higher than in the United States. In contrast to the United States, however, 
output and yields in Argentina remained relatively stagnant between the 
mid-1920s and the mid-1970s. It was not until the late 1970s that Argentina 
began to realize significant gains in agricultural productivity. Part of this lag 
in Argentine agricultural development was due to the disruption of export 
markets in the 1930s and 1940s. Students of Argentine development have 
also pointed to the political dominance of a landed aristocracy and to the 
rising tensions between urban and rural interests, that resulted in 
inappropriate domestic policies toward agriculture (de Janvry 1973; Smith 
1969 and 1974; Cavallo and Mundlak 1982). The Argentine case would 
seem to represent a case where the bias in the distribution of political and 
economic resources imposed exceptionally strong constraints on the 
institutional innovations needed to take advantage of the relatively 
inexpensive sources of growth that technical change in agriculture could 
have made available.  
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Cultural endowments, including religion and ideology, may exert a 
strong influence on the supply of institutional innovation. They make some 
forms of institutional change less costly to establish and impose severe costs 
on others (Jones 1999; Tan 2005). For example, the traditional moral 
obligation in the Japanese village community to cooperate in joint 
communal infrastructure maintenance made it less costly to implement 
modernizing rural development programs than in societies where such 
traditions do not prevail. These activities had their origin in the feudal 
organization of rural communities in the pre-Meiji period. But practices such 
as maintenance of village and agricultural roads and of irrigation and 
drainage ditches through joint activities in which all families contribute 
labor were still practiced in well over half of the hamlets in Japan as recently 
as 1970 (Ishikawa 1981). The traditional patterns of cooperation have 
represented an important form of social capital on which to erect modern 
forms of cooperative marketing and joint farming activities. Similar cultural 
resources were not available in many South Asian villages where, for 
example, the caste structure inhibits cooperation and encourages 
specialization (Lal 1998; Ruttan 2003: 232-235). 
Advances in social sciences that improve knowledge relevant to the 
design of institutional innovations that are capable of generating new income  
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streams or that reduce the cost of conflict resolution act to shift the supply of 
institutional change to the right. The research that led to advances in our 
understanding of the production and consumption behavior of rural 
households in less developed countries represents an important example of 
the contribution of advances in social science knowledge to the design of 
more efficient institutions (Schultz 1964; Nerlove 1974; Binswanger, 
Evenson, Florencio and White 1981). In a number of countries this research 
has led to the abandonment of policies that viewed peasant households as 
unresponsive to economic incentives. And it has led to the design of more 
incentive compatible factor and product markets and to institutions to make 
more productive technologies available to peasant producers.
11 
 4.1  Collective Action 
  Modest advances were made, beginning in the late 1950s, by students 
of what became variously known as the “new political economy” or the 
“new institutional economics” to explore the economic and political basis of 
collective action (Downs 1957; Olson 1965; Hardin 1968). The penetration 
of the political economy perspective into the traditional territory of political 
                                                 
11 The international agricultural research system organized under the 
auspices of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research 
(CGIAR) represents a particularly impressive example of an institutional 
innovation that became an exceedingly powerful source of improvement in 
crop technology for developing countries in the tropics (Evenson and Gollin 
2003).  
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science was initially welcomed (or at least not actively opposed) by many 
political scientists who found the new analytical tools drawn primarily from 
economics useful (Almond 1993). 
  The major implications drawn by the early practitioners of the new 
institutional economics were profoundly conservative: “Unless the number 
of individuals in the group is quite small, or unless there is coercion or some 
other device to make individuals act in their common interests, rational self-
interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests 
(Olson 1965: 2). The initial positive reception of this “zero contribution” 
inference was followed by a large critical literature. Elinor Ostrom has 
insisted: “Many people do vote, not cheat on their taxes, and contribute to 
voluntary organizations.  … Individuals in all parts of the world voluntarily 
organize themselves to gain the benefits of trade, to provide material 
protection against risk, and to create and enforce rules that protect natural 
resources (Ostrom 2000: 137-138). 
 Over several decades Ostrom and colleagues at the University of 
Indiana, Workshop on Political Theory and Policy Analysis,  have brought 
together the results of a massive body of field observations, extensive 
laboratory evidence, and careful theoretical analysis to distill a set of 
principles that provide fundamental insight into the evolution of institutional  
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change and the design of institutional innovations (Table 2). The principles 
articulated in Table 2 are drawn, in large part from examples of 
“spontaneous order” arising out of individual and small group behavior. But 
the lessons drawn from this experience by social science research represents 
the foundation for a set of principles or rules for the design of incentive 
compatible institutions to enhance economic development at the community 
and regional level (Ostrom 1992; Boettke and Coyne 2005). 
/ insert Table 2 about here / 
 4.2  Constructed Markets 
In this section I present a case study of the contribution of advances in 
social science knowledge to the design of a contemporary institutional 
innovation at the national level. The case involves the design and 
implementation of an emission trading system to reduce the transaction costs 
of controlling sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions—an important industrial 
pollutant. Advances in economic knowledge led to an understanding of the 
very large cost reductions that could be achieved by designing a 
“constructed market” to replace the “command and control” approach to the 
management of SO2 emissions.
12 
                                                 
12 This section draws heavily on Ruttan (2001: 511-516).  For a retrospective 
perspective on the use of tradable permits see Tietenberg (2002).  
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The concept behind the design of a constructed market for the control 
of SO2 pollutants is fairly simple. It is based on the realization that the 
behavioral sources of the pollution problem can often be traced to poorly 
defined property rights in open access natural resources such as air and 
water. A system of property rights and tradable permits for the management 
of pollution was first proposed in the late 1960s by Crocker (1966) and 
Dales (1968a, 1968b). The suggested institutional innovation did not emerge 
from its inventors in a fully operational form. Their proposals were followed 
by a large theoretical and empirical literature by resource and environmental 
economists (Bohm 1985). Design and implementation involved an extended 
process of “learning by doing” and “learning by using.” 
Proposals to replace the command and control approach by Presidents 
Johnson and Nixon by effluent fees or taxes on pollutants were dismissed as 
impractical and characterized by environmental activists as a “license to 
pollute.” Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, a series of events conspired 
to make a more market oriented approach to reducing SO2 emissions 
politically feasible (Taylor 1989: 28-34; Hahn and Stavins 1991; Stavins 
1998). One was the predilection of President George H. W. Bush in favor of 
a market oriented approach to environmental policy. Another was the 
enthusiasm of Environmental Protection Agency administrator William  
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Reilly and a number of key staff members in the Executive Office of the 
President for validating Bush’s desire to be known as “the environmental 
president.” There was also bipartisan support in key Congressional 
committees for a variety of market based approaches to environmental 
policy. 
Within the environmental community the Environmental Defense 
Fund (EDF) began to differentiate itself from the rest of the environmental 
community by advocating market based approaches as early as the mid-
1980s. In 1989 EDF staff began to work closely with the White House staff 
in drafting an early version of proposed legislation. The credibility of the 
effort was enhanced by the fact that EPA Administrator Reilly, formerly 
president of the Conservation Foundation, was a “card carrying” 
environmentalist. Executives of several major corporations, influenced by 
subtle lobbying by the EDF commented favorably on the emissions trading 
proposals. 
The design of the SO2 emissions trading system advanced in the Clean 
Air Act of 1990 drew on earlier EPA experience. The EPA began 
experimenting with emission trading permits in 1974. The early programs 
included the elimination of lead in gasoline, the phase-out of 
chlorofluorocarbons and halons in refrigeration, and the reduction of water  
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pollution from nonpoint sources. The early programs had a mixed record. 
They were typically grafted onto existing command-and-control programs. 
The difficulty of converting from command-and-control programs 
encountered substantial transaction costs. These experiences did, however, 
provide important lessons for the design of more market oriented trading 
programs in the 1990s. 
The Clean Air Act created a national market for SO2 allowances for 
coal burning electrical utilities. The commodity exchanged in the SO2 
emissions trading program is a property right to emit SO2 that was created 
by the EPA and allocated to individual firms. A firm can make allowances 
that had been issued to it available to be traded to other firms by reducing its 
own emissions of the pollutant below its own base line level. In 1995, the 
programs first year, 110 of the nation’s dirtiest coal burning plants were 
included in the program. The affected plants were allowed to emit 2.5 
pounds of SO2 for each million British Thermal Units (Btu) of energy that 
they generated. During Phase II, initially projected to begin in 2000, almost 
all coal-burning plants were scheduled to be included and allowances for 
each plant to be reduced to 1.2 pounds per million Btu. Utilities that 
“overcomply” by reducing their emissions more than required may sell their  
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excess allowances. Utilities that find it more difficult, or expensive, to meet 
the requirements may purchase allowances from other utilities. 
Emission trading has been even more cost effective than originally 
anticipated. Prior to initiation of the program the utility industry had 
complained that reducing SO2 in amounts sufficient to meet the projected 
target (down from about 19 million tons in 1980 to 8.95 million tons in 
2000) might cost as much as $1,500 per ton. By the late 1990s allowances 
were being sold in the $100-150 range. The decline in the cost of abatement 
has been due in part to technical changes in coal mining and deregulation of 
rail transport that have lowered the cost of low sulphur coal to mid-western 
power producers. It has also been due to technical changes in fuel blending 
and SO2 scrubbing that was induced by the introduction of performance 
based allowance trading. As a result benefits substantially exceeded early 
estimates (Joskow, Smalensee and Bailey 1998). 
The successful experience with SO2 emissions trading illustrates a 
very important principle in inventing new property rights institutions to 
manage formerly open access resources. In a now classic paper Coase 
(1960) argued that when only a few decision makers are involved in the 
generation of externalities, the two parties, if left to themselves, will 
voluntarily negotiate a new institutional mechanisms—rules and payments— 
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that result in a reduction of the externalities to an acceptable level. However 
important the Coase theorem might be for understanding the small 
institutional innovations in the Philippine village case presented earlier in 
this paper, it has little relevance to most contemporary large scale externality 
problems.  
The important externality problems that concern society today—such 
as SO2 pollution, ozone pollution or the greenhouse gases responsible for 
global climate change—typically involve large numbers of polluters and 
even larger numbers of persons affected by the externalities. In contrast to 
the evolution of a “natural market” government must establish the conditions 
necessary for a “constructed” market to function. In the SO2 case it was 
necessary for an outside principle, the U.S. Congress, to define the size (or 
the boundaries) of the resource, in this case the maximum tons of SO2 
emissions, and to establish the trading rules. The social science effort 
involved in the design and implementation of the institutional arrangements 
and mechanisms to confront such problems requires the mobilization of 




  28 
5.  Mechanism Design 
The case studies presented in the previous two sections (4.1 and 4.2) 
represent important early examples of incentive compatible institutional 
design. They did not draw on the emerging mechanism design literature. 
Beginning in the late 1950’s Leonid Hurwicz and several colleagues began 
to direct their attention to the design of mechanisms and institutions.
13 The 
results of this effort have been truly revolutionary!  In 2007 the Nobel Prize 
Committee awarded Hurwicz and two colleagues, Roger P. Myerson and 
Eric Maskin, the Nobel Award in economics.  The Award committee noted 
that mechanism design theory began with the work of Leonid Hurwicz in 
1960.  However, the theory became relevant to a wide variety of applications 
only after Hurwicz introduced the key notion of incentive compatibility in 
1972 (Nobel Prize Committee 2007: 2). 
 As noted above, the orthodox view in economics, articulated by Paul 
Samuelson, 1970 Nobel awardee, held: “The auxiliary (institutional) 
constraints imposed on the variables are not themselves the proper subject of 
welfare economics but must be taken as given” (Samuelson, 1948: 321-322). 
                                                 
13 Hurwicz distinguished between two types of normative analysis. One is to 
take the organizational structure as given while considering alternative 
policies within such a structure. The other is to take organizational structure 
itself as the variable. “It is this latter type of choice that we have called the 
designers point of view” (Hurwicz 1972: 37).  
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Friedrich Hayek, 1974 Nobel awardee, held that institutional change 
emerged our of organic processes, which he termed “spontaneous order” 
(Hayek 1978: 3). The concept of incentive compatible mechanism design 
removed the ideological, disciplinary and ethical blinders that had limited 
the scope of a more analytical and institutional economics. Hayek had feared 
the unintended consequences of efforts by the market socialists to substitute 
planning for markets. Samuelson viewed the normative judgments involved 
in institutional reform as outside the scope of the discipline of economics. 
Hurwicz, in contrast, insisted that the design of institutional arrangements 
was a central issue for economics. He laid the foundations for what the 
Economist termed the “intelligent design” of incentive compatible 
institutional arrangements (Economist, 10/20/07).
14 
 In later work Hurwicz has addressed the question of the feasibility of 
achieving Pareto optimality in both classical and non-classical 
environments.
15 It has been long recognized that in non-classical 
environments economists are confronted, in attempting to design 
mechanisms and institutions, with problems of incomplete information, 
                                                 
14 For a more complete and accessible discussion of the mechanisms design 
problem see Runge and Ruttan 2008. 
15  “Classical environments are characterized by absence of external 
economies or diseconomies of scale, imperfect divisibility of goods, and  
convexity or the relevant sets and functions describing preferences and 
technology” (Hurwicz 1972: 38).   
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economies of scale, technical change, missing markets, non market resource 
allocation and other sources of imperfection. As noted above in such 
environments government or some other authority must often be called in to 
design and enforce reasonably “incentive efficient” mechanisms (Sandeep 
and Maskin 2003). 
 In a remarkable paper published in 1981,  “Incentive problems in the 
Design of Non-wasteful Resource Allocation,” Hurwicz developed the proof 
of an “impossibility theorem” (first conjectured by Samuelson), that even in 
an informationally decentralized classical economy it is impossible to design 
mechanisms or institutions capable of achieving Pareto optimality.
16 One 
constraint is the presence of private information. A second reason is that the 
operation of the mechanisms themselves employ scarce resources. Thus a 
first best Pareto optimality is generally not achievable. This negative result 
is extremely important because it focuses the attention on the comparative 
costs of the operation of the mechanisms and institutions. It also opens up 
the issue of the implications of new mechanism and institutions designed to 
improve welfare by generating new income streams (by reducing transaction 
costs, for example) and by introducing new mechanisms that improve the 
distribution of income (Hurwicz 1972: 43). 
                                                 
16 For a more formal treatment see Mass-Corell (1995: 858-869).  
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 Hurwicz and his colleagues have established a foundation for a new 
and more powerful institutional economics. Their work challenges the 
conservative underpinning of Hayek’s concept of spontaneous order,  it 
breaks through the disciplinary constraints of  neo-classical theory, and it 
challenges  the relevance of Pareto optimality in normative economics 
(Runge and Ruttan, 2008). 
  
6.  Toward a More Complete Model 
In Figure 2 I present in graphical form the elements of a pattern model that 
maps the relationships among changes in resource endowments and cultural 
endowments, and changes in technology and institutions.
17 The model goes 
beyond the conventional general equilibrium model in which resource 
                                                 
17 Fusfeld used the terms 'pattern' or 'Gestalt' model to describe a form of 
analysis that links the elements of a general pattern together by logical 
connections. The recursive multi-causal relationships of the pattern model 
imply that the model is always 'open'--'it can never include all of the relevant 
variables and relationships necessary for a full understanding of the 
phenomenon under investigation' (Fusfeld 1980: 33). Ostrom uses the term 
framework rather than pattern model. “The framework for analyzing 
problems of institutional choice illustrates the complex configuration of 
variables when individuals ... attempt to fashion rules to improve their 
individual and joint outcomes. The reason for presenting this complex array 
of variables as a framework rather than a model is precisely because one 
cannot encompass the degree of complexity within a single model” (Ostrom 
1990: 214). Richard Nelson (2006: 195-212) views economic growth as 
driven by the co-evolution of physical technologies and social technologies 
(or institutions).  
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endowments, technologies, institutions, and culture (conventionally 
designated as “tastes” in the economics literature) are given.
18  In the study 
of long-term social and economic change the relationships among the 
variables must be treated as recursive and dynamic (Harsanyi 1960).  
/ insert Figure 2 about here / 
An important advantage of the pattern model outlined in Figure 2 is 
that it avoids the necessity of choosing between a materialist conception of 
human action, in which agents mechanically respond to changes in resource 
endowments, and an idealist conception of human action, in which agents 
respond only to subjective changes in cultural endowments (such as religion 
or ideology).  A second advantage is that it helps us to identify our areas of 
ignorance. 
Our capacity to model and test the relationships between resource 
endowments and technical change is relatively strong.  In spite of recent 
advances in induced innovation theory and in mechanism and institutional 
                                                 
18 In economics the concept of cultural endowments has traditionally 
subsumed under the concept of 'tastes' which are regarded as 'given'--that is, 
not subject to economic analysis (Stigler and Becker 1977; Jones 1995; 
Ruttan 2003: 33-67). I use the term cultural endowments to capture those 
dimensions of culture that have been transmitted from the past. 
Contemporary changes in institutions, for example, can be expected to 
“harden” into the next generation’s cultural endowments.  
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design our capacity to model and test the relationships between cultural 
endowments and either technical or institutional change is relatively weak.   
The model is also useful in identifying model components that have 
entered into attempts by other scholars to account for secular economic and 
social change. I illustrate below with several examples.
19 
Historians working within the Marxist tradition often tend to view 
technical change as dominating both institutional and cultural change. In his 
classic book, Oriental Despotism, Wittfogel (mistakenly) viewed the 
irrigation technology used in wet rice cultivation in East Asia as determining 
political organization (Wittfogel 1957). In terms of Figure 1 his primary 
emphasis was on the impact of changes in resources and technology on 
institutions (C) and (B). A serious misunderstanding can also be observed in 
the neo-Marxian critiques of the 'green revolution' in rice production in Asia 
(Cleaver 1972; Hayami and Ruttan 1985: 336-45). These criticisms focused 
attention almost entirely on the impact of technical change on labor and land 
tenure relations. Both the radical and populist critics emphasized relation 
                                                 
19 Induced innovation theory should be viewed as a diagnostic tool. Accurate 
prediction is not an appropriate test of the theory. If, for example, an 
increase in population pressure against land resources fails to induce the 
expected innovation in property rights institutions the appropriate response 
is to augment the model. Thus in my own work I employ induced innovation 
theory not to predict the effects of changes in resource endowments, 
technology, institutions and culture but rather as a guide to a “dialogue with 
data” and as a guide to mechanism and institutional design.  
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(B).  But they tended to neglect the effects of rising population pressure 
against land (relationships A and C). 
Economists such as Coase (1960) and Alchian and Demsetz (1973) 
identify a primary function of property rights as guiding incentives to 
achieve greater internalization of externalities. North and Thomas, building 
on the Alchian-Demsetz paradigm, attempted to explain the economic 
growth of Western Europe between 900 and 1700 primarily in terms of 
changes in property institutions (North and Thomas 1970: 1-17; Field 1981).  
The population decline in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was viewed 
as a primary factor leading to the demise of feudalism and the rise of the 
national state (line C).  
 Mancur Olson (1968, 1982), in an attempt to explain the more rapid 
growth of Germany and Japan relative to the United States and Britain, in 
the first several decades  after World War II, emphasized the proliferation 
and rigidity of institutions as a source of economic decline. He also regarded 
broad-based encompassing organizations as having incentives to generate 
growth and redistribute incomes to their members with little excess burden. 
These distributional coalitions make political life more divisive. They slow 
down the adoption of new technologies (line b) and limit the capacity to 
reallocate resources (line c). The effect is to slow down economic growth or  
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in some cases initiate a period of economic decline. In a more recent work 
Greif (1994) has emphasized the differential impact of the collectivist 
cultural endowments of Maghrebi traders and the individualistic cultural 
endowments of Genoese traders on the development of commercial 
institutions in the Mediterranean region in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. 
The impact of differences in resource endowments on the 
international diffusion of institutions has recently been explored in a series 
of important papers (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002; Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson 2001; Levine 2005). A common conclusion is that where the 
disease environment was not favorable to settlement European states 
established extractive colonies (such as the Spanish in Mexico and Peru, 
Britain in the Gold Coast and Belgium in the Congo. Where the disease 
environment was favorable they established settler colonies.  Where 
extractive colonies were established legal institutions were adopted that 
favored the extraction and transfer of resources to the metropolitan country 
and after independence to the new ruling elites. In settler colonies, in 
contrast, legal institutions that favored the rule of law and encouraged 
investment were established. These differences in legal culture and 
institutions continue to explain substantial differences in per capita income 
and income distribution, (lines F, D and C).  
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A potential criticism of the pattern model approach depicted in Figure 
1 is that it does not stipulate the mechanisms through which changes in 
resource endowments, for example, induce changes in technology or 
institutions. However it is not too difficult to visualize some of the most 
important mechanisms that mediate the relationships among changes in 
resource endowments, technical change and institutional change.
 The market 
represents a “master mechanism” for translating the uncoordinated behavior 
of individuals into system level coordination (Headstrom and Swedberg 
1998: 3).  
 
7.  Perspective 
What are the implications of the theory of induced institutional change 
for research on the contribution of social science knowledge to economic 
development? In my research with Hayami and Binswanger on the direction 
and rate of technical change we were able to advance significantly our 
knowledge by treating technical change as largely endogenous—as induced 
primarily by changes in relative resource endowments and the growth of 
demand. We were also able to interpret the advances in knowledge about the 
role of changes in the economic environment on the rate and direction of  
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technical change for the design of research systems and the allocation of 
research resources (Ruttan 1982; 2001).  
In this paper I have presented a theory of induced institutional change. 
I argue that the theory has advanced our understanding of the process of 
institutional change. It suggests that substantial new insights have been 
obtained by treating institutional change as a response to changes or 
differences in resource endowments, technical change and cultural 
endowments. But, as in the case of technical change, my concern goes 
beyond advancing our understanding of the process of institutional 
innovation. It is essential for the social sciences to advance our 
understanding of the historical processes of social and economic 
development. But that is not sufficient! If social science knowledge is to be 
valued by society it must also advance the knowledge to successfully 
intervene in the process of development—to reduce the cost of the "trial and 
error"—that has been the constant companion of the historic “organic” 
processes of institutional innovation.  A functional goal of the social 
sciences (including economics) is not just to understand human behavior but 
to evaluate proposals for institutional reform and to design new and better 
mechanisms and institutions (Myerson 1999: 1069).  
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 Beginning in the mid-1980s I initiated a program of research and 
writing designed to explore in greater depth what development economists 
should learn from scholars in the other nomothetic social sciences—
anthropology, sociology and political science—working in the field of 
development. My book, Social Science Knowledge and Economic 
Development (Ruttan 2003) grew out of that effort. A consistent theme in 
that book and in this paper is that advances in social science knowledge 
represent a powerful source of economic growth and more broadly of 
economic development. Advances in social science knowledge represent a 
high payoff input into economic development. This position falls squarely 
into the tradition of Enlightenment political philosophy. The U.S. 
Constitution was an early, and magnificent, example of this design 
perspective. 
The design perspective stands in sharp contrast to the organic or 
evolutionary perspective. Hayek, for example, has argued that improvements 
in institutional performance are the result of a process of collective learning 
that has passed the slow test of time and are embodied in a people’s 
language, culture and institutions. This accumulated knowledge is built into 
ways of learning and has a powerful impact on both the present and the 
future. Since collective learning occurs at the level of the community rather  
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than the individual there are severe constraints on the rational design of 
policies and institutions. But there can be no presumption that the 
institutions that emerge out of the process of social evolution, unguided by 
advances in social science knowledge, will result in efficient trajectories of 
cultural, social, or economic development (Hayek 1967, 1978; North 1994).  
Spontaneous order is not enough! 
In closing I would like to emphasize again that the work on incentive 
compatible mechanism and institutional design initiated by Hurwicz has 
widened the scope for social scientists to contribute to institutional analysis, 
design and implementation. It challenges the adequacy of concepts of 
spontaneous order, organic and evolutionary approaches to the analysis, 
design and implementation of institutional change. It breaks through the 
disciplinary constraints of neoclassical theory and erodes the relevance of 
Pareto optimality in normative economics. It has not yet, however, provided 
us with an application “tool kit” for mechanism and an institutional design. 
The concept of incentive compatibility is, however, an exceedingly powerful 
intellectual concept.  It may be even more powerful as metaphor than as an 
analytical concept. 
The pattern model outlined in this paper is built on recursive 
relationships among changes in resource endowments, technology,  
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institutions and culture. Successful institutional innovation will almost 
always be culture specific. It involves more than simply institutional (or 
technology) transfer. Advances in social science knowledge can open up 
new and productive opportunities for institutional innovation and design that 
enhance development. In the induced institutional innovation model there is 
no role for simple resource, technological, institutional or cultural 
determinism. The dialectical relationships among changes in resource and 
cultural endowments and technical and institutional change influence the 
rate and direction of social, political and economic development. And the 
feedback from these changes becomes the sources of change in resource and 
cultural endowments. 
Finally I would like to emphasize that the complementary relationship 
between mechanism design theory and the theory of induced institutional 
innovation. Designers are not free to ignore the long term secular shifts in 
resource and cultural endowments.  Nor can they ignore contemporary 
changes in technical and institutional environments.  
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TABLE 1. Factor shares of rice output per hectare, 1976 wet season 
 




           
Land 
 
     


























Share tenancy land  30  29.7  2,749 
      (100.0) 
697 
     (25.3) 
698 




     (25.4) 
850 
    (30.9) 
288 
    (10.5) 
216 
      (7.9) 
 
 
Leasehold land  44  67.7  2,889 
     (100.0) 
657 
    (22.7) 
567 




     (19.6) 
918 
    (31.8) 
337 
    (11.7) 
410 
     (14.2) 
 
 
Subtenancy land  16  9.1  3,447 
     (100.0) 
801 
     (23.2) 
504 
     (14.6) 
801
c 
    (23.2) 
1,305 
       (37.8) 
1,008 
       (29.3) 
346 
    (10.1) 
-13 




Source:  Yujiro Hayami and Masao Kikuchi, Asian Village Economy at the Crossroads, An Economic Approach to Institutional Change (Tokyo: University of Tokyo 
Press, 1981, and Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 111-13. 
 
a  Percentage shares are shown in parentheses. 
b Sum of irrigation fee and paid and/or imputed rentals of carabao, tractor, and other machines. 
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Table 2. Institutional Design Principles 
 
Elinor Ostrom and colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at 
Indiana University have articulated eight design principles drawn from their research on 
self-organized resource management regimes. 
 The first design principle is that the presence of clear boundaries and rules 
…enables participants to know who is in and who is outside of a defined set of 
relationships and thus with whom to cooperate. 
 The second design principle is that the local rules-in-use define the amount, 
timing, timing and technology of harvesting the resource: allocate the benefits 
proportional to required inputs; and are drafted to take local conditions into account. 
 The third design principle is that most of the individuals affected by the resource 
regime can participate in making and modifying the rules. Resource regimes that that use 
this principle are both able to tailor better rules to local circumstances and to devise rules 
that are considered fair by participants. 
 The fourth design principle is that … resource regimes select their own monitors, 
who are accountable to the users or are users themselves and who keep an eye on 
resource conditions as well as on their use. 
 The fifth design principle is that the resource regimes use graduated sanctions that 
depend on the seriousness and context of the offense. By creating official positions for 
local monitors a resource regime does not have to depend only on willing punishers to 
impose personal costs on those who break a rule.  
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 The sixth design principle is the importance of access to rapid, low cost, local 
arenas to resolve conflict among users or between users and officials. By devising simple, 
local mechanisms to get conflicts aired immediately the number of conflicts that reduce 
trust can be reduced. 
 The seventh design principle is that the capability of local users to deliver an ever-
more effective regime over time is affected by whether they have minimal recognition of 
the right to organize by a local, regional or national government unit. 
 The eighth design principle that characterizes systems when common pool 
resources are somewhat larger is the presence of government activities organized in 
multiple layers of nested enterprises. Among long enduring self-organized regimes, 
smaller scale organizations tend to be nested in ever-larger organizations. 
 
This table is adapted from the institutional deign principles articulated in Elinor Ostrum, 
“Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms,” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 14 (2000): 237-58. The institutional design rules developed by Elinor 
Ostrom drew heavily on her research on the design and management of irrigation 
systems. See Elinor Ostrom, 1992, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation 
Systems, San Francisco: ICS Press. The design principles were most fully articulated in 
Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
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Figure 1.  Global Agricultural Land and Labor Productivity, 1961-2003 
 
 
Source: Pardey, P.G., J. James, J. Alston, S. Wood, B. Koo, E. Binenbaum, T. Hurley and P. 
Glewwe.  Science, Technology and Skills.  Background Paper for the World Bank’s World 
Development Report 2008.  St. Paul, Rome and Washington D.C.: University of Minnesota, 
CGIAR Science Council and World Bank, 2007.  
 
Notes: Workers are economically active in agriculture.  Land is the sum of area harvested and 
permanently pastured.  Output is value of production farmed by weighting a time series of 
commodity quantities for each country by a 1989-1991 average of commodity-specific average of 
international prices.  All productivity trajectories start in 1961 on left/bottom and end in 2003 on 
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Figure 2.   Interrelationships between changes in resource endowments, cultural 
endowments, technology, and institutions. (From Yujiro Hayami and Vernon 
Ruttan, Agricultural Development: An International Perspective, rev. ed. 

































   
 
 
 
 